An Algorithm for the Decentralized Market Coupling Problem by Basagoiti, Pedro et al.
An algorithm for the  




P. Basagoiti 1, J. J. González 2  and M. Álvarez 3* 
 
1 OMEL, Spain 
Alfonso XII,6 
28014 Madrid, Spain 
Phone +34 916598933 
E-mail: pbasagoiti@omel.es 
 
2 OMEL, Spain 
Alfonso XII,6 
28014 Madrid, Spain 
Phone +34 916598926 
E-mail: jjgonzalez@omel.es 
 
 3 ETSI Industriales, UPM, Spain 
 José Gutiérrez Abascal, 2 
28016 Madrid, Spain 







Keywords---Market Coupling, Block Bids, Lagrangian 
Relaxation. 
 
Abstract--In this communication a conceptual algorithm is 
proposed for the market coupling process in the presence of 
block orders. The basic idea is to use the Lagrangian relaxation 
to get a decomposition of the problem that emulates the necessary 
decentralization process.  The feasibility of this procedure is 
analysed using a simplified model of the problem. In particular, 
the solution obtained in this decentralized way is contrasted with 
the numerically exact solution of the problem by evaluating the 
duality gap. The examples presented suggest that in this way 
reasonably approximate solutions can be obtained, to improve 




I. INTRODUCTION  
 
Probably the most widely accepted methodology for the 
integration of the European Electricity Markets is the so-called 
Flow based Market Coupling. Jointly proposed by ETSO and 
EuroPEX, the basic accepted assumption is that the EEM can 
be operated as a series of single-price zones that can be linked 
by coupling their markets, while respecting the capacity of the 
interconnections.  
An essential component of flow based market coupling is 
the implementation of a working procedure for coupling the 
electricity markets at the day-ahead stage in a decentralized 
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manner, so that each market maintains its own rules of 
operation. With market coupling, the daily cross-border 
transmission capacity between various areas is not explicitly 
auctioned among the market parties, but is implicitly made 
available via energy transactions on the power exchanges on 
either side of the border. In this way, by allowing that the 
cheapest generation of the system can meet the demand in any  
market while maintaining their autonomy of operation, the 
total economic surplus will be maximized and a global price 
reduction is usually obtained.  
The coupling of two electricity markets when working in a 
single period (hour) basis is conceptually simple. It is even 
possible to solve the problem graphically through the so-called 
export-import curves, which provide the modification of 
prices in each market as a function of the energy exchanged 
with the neighbour market. To create these curves, each 
market determines the local clearing price and a curve that 
indicates the price dependency as a function of the changing 
import/export volume. Using these curves and the known 
transport capacity a coupling is applied that, without 
congestions, results in a single price. This scheme can be 
extended to the case where there are more than two markets.  
However, the situation changes drastically when the market 
rules permit the presentation of complex bids, typically in the 
form of indivisible multi-period energy blocks. Even in the 
case of a single market, this is a complex optimization 
problem, and in the European markets, iterative heuristic 
procedures are usually applied  to obtain the clearing prices. 
The extension of these procedures to several coupling markets 
is much more problematic, and it is necessary to establish 
simplifying and empiric criteria to reach a solution. 
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The problem of a matching algorithm dealing with complex 
bids may be formulated as a problem of mixed programming 
and, at least theoretically, it can be numerically solved using 
appropriate software. From this perspective, in this 
communication, a conceptual algorithm for market coupling 
between electricity markets in the presence of complex bids is 
proposed. The basic idea is to use the Lagrangian relaxation to 
get a decomposition of the problem that emulates the 
necessary decentralization process. The feasibility of this 
procedure is analysed using a simplified model of the 
problem. In particular, the solution obtained in this 
decentralized way is contrasted with the numerically exact 
solution of the problem by evaluating the duality gap. The 
examples presented suggest that in this way approximate 
solutions can be reasonably obtained, improving those 
obtained through empirical procedures currently used by 
market operators.   
 
II.  MARKET COUPLING 
 
A.  Auction with complex bids 
In European electricity markets, the day ahead price is 
determined mainly by the matching of demand and generation 
bids, defining the hourly prices by the intersection points of 
inverse supply and demand curves. This procedure is justified 
because it ensures the maximum surplus of the market. To 
facilitate that the market participants could adapt their offers 
to its cost structures, it is common practice to allow 
participants in the markets to offer complex bids with fixed 
and indivisible volumes extended in several hours and 
considered firm only if hourly prices results in a minimum 
average price. The presence of this type of block orders 
complicates the auction process and all European electricity 
markets have established more or less empirical procedures to 
obtain the clearing prices. Essentially. these procedures first 
make the hourly auction by incorporating complex bids as if 
they were simple, checking subsequently if block volumes are 
included and if the averaging prices are compatible with the 
block price limitations. After removing those block orders that 
do not comply with their imposed conditions, the process is 
repeated until an acceptable situation is obtained. This process 
usually ends with the undesirable result of  paradoxically 
rejected block orders, because of their prices are lower than 
the market price. 
The problem of multi-period auction bids in the presence of 
complex blocks can be posed as a minimization problem. Our 
formulation is developed under assumptions that set aside 
many important aspects of the market reality. It is intended 
only to highlight the computational difficulties inherent to this 
problem, even in a very simplified version,   complicating its 
effective numerical solution. 
The supply of generation is modelled as follows. First, we 
suppose a supply of continuous generation with variable 
increasing price, whose volume in each hour can be set free 
and unlimited. His offer price is determined by an increasing 
function of the energy generated in each time period by  
( ),              1,...,hp G q h H= =  
Typically each of these functions is monotone, discontinuous 
and piecewise constant, or monotone continuous and 
piecewise linear. Along with these simple offers in each 
period, there are block bids defined by a set of pairs price-
volume  
( , ),         n 1,...,n np q N=  
whose meaning is as follows: each pair represents a fixed and 
indivisible nq  volume generation for each hour of a specified 
period under the restriction that all the volumes must be 
accepted or rejected together in all the periods; besides the 
offer is made firm only under the condition that the average 
price over the hours covered by the complex bid resulting in 
the auction process is not less than the value np . To limit the 
complexity of the notation, we have considered that the power 
offered by the block offers in each time period is the same; the 
treatment of the more general case of variable volumes is 
similar, with no other added difficulty than the use of a more 
complex notation. In addition, for the same reasons, it is 
assumed that the consumer demand in each hour is inelastic, 
being represented by the quantity hQ  in the h  hour.  
The allocation of generation in a way that maximizes the 
social welfare of the market leads to the following 
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whose first H  variables 1,..., ,Hx x  are nonnegative and 
represent the continuous generation in each hour, while the 
remaining N  variables nu  can only take values 0 or 1, 
depending on whether the corresponding block is or is not 
included as part of the generation. Additionally, the variables 
are restricted by the equalities 
1
,         1,...,
N
h n n h
n
x q u Q h H
=
+ = =∑  
which represent the balance of demand and generation in each 
hour. Finally, by agreeing that the clearing market price at 
every hour is determined by the volume of the continuous 
generation accepted, the conditions of minimum average 
prices fixed in blocks orders impose the inequalities 
1
1 ( )       1,...,
H
n n h h
h
p u G x n N
H =
≤ =∑  
Posed in this way, the multi-period auction problem with 
block bids appears as a problem of mixed programming, with 
both continuous and integer variables, more specifically 
binary. In general, depending on the nature of the functions 
that characterize the variable generation, we have a non-linear 
programming problem. However, in the event that the 
continuous offer generation is represented by an increasing 
piecewise constant function, which is the case in some 
markets, the corresponding cost generation would be a 
piecewise linear function and the problem can be reformulated 
as mixed linear programming problem. Similarly, in the case 
of piecewise linear offer function, the problem can be 
formulated as a mixed quadratic problem with linear 
constraints. In any case, although there are software packages 
aimed at solving this type of programmes, when the number of 
variables is very high the presence of binary variables makes 
these problems difficult to solve. In real market operations, in 
order to guarantee that the scheduled transactions will be 
available in real time, heuristic procedures for the solution of 
this problem are in greater or lesser degree necessary. This is 
the usual mode of operation in the European markets. 
 
B. Market coupling with complex bids. 
Using notations that extend those employed in the case of a 
single market, the coupling of two electricity markets can be 
posed as the following optimization problem. The objective 
function is defined by 
2 1 2 1 1 2 2 2( , ; , ) : ( ) ( )f f f= +1 1x x u u x ,u x ,u  
which expression includes the two real H -dimensional real 
vectors 1x  and 2x  representing the continuous generation 
volumes of each market in each hour and the iN -dimensional 
binary vector iu  is associated with the block order of the i -th 
market. By expressing with 1hQ  and 2hQ  the inelastic 
demands of consumers in both markets at the h  hour, these 
variables are restricted by the equalities that impose the 
satisfaction of the total joint demand in every hour as follows  
1 2
1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2
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N N
h n n h n n h h
n n
x q u x q u Q Q
= =
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As in the case of a single market, we have also the 
restrictions on the average price of each market imposed for 
the price lower limits of each block order, that are written as 
the inequalities 
1
1 ( ) 1
H
in in ih ih i
h
p u G x n N
H =
≤ ≤ ≤∑            (2) 
Notice that these restrictions affect separately each market.  
Moreover, in the simplified scenario of no restrictions on 
the transmission network, equality of the clearing prices in 
both markets gives the new equations  
1 1 2 2( ) ( )h h h hG x G x=   (3) 
Once more, we set aside the more general case for the sake 
of simplicity, but it is not difficult to extend our formulation to 
cover the existence of limited transmission capacity.  
In principle this problem is not different in nature from the 
problem posed for a single market. But in this case, we have 
the added difficulty to perform this minimization process in a 
decoupled way, excluding the possibility of using the overall 
bids presented at the two markets, as it is considered 
confidential information and may not be shared between them. 
In the absence of complex bids, the market coupling is 
relatively simple, as the energy interchanged between the two 
markets can be obtained by a coordinator by using the net 
supply curves of each markets in every hour.  
 
These curves are obtained from the functions 
( ) : ( )ih ih ihz G Q z= +π  
which represent the increases (decreases) of the prices in that 
market in the hour h  when the demands increases (decreases) 
in the volume z . If there are no transmission capacity 
limitations, the net energy hz  transferred in the hour h  from 
the first to the second market is the solution of the equation  
1 2( ) ( )h h h hz z= −π π  
and this solution can be easily obtained graphically from the 
corresponding pair of net supply curves. 
When there are complex bids, it is possible to try the 
implementation of the previous method by imposing in each 
market a pre-selection of a subset of its blocks orders, the 
acceptance of which is assumed in each market, at the same 
time that the complementary set of block orders is excluded. 
This reduces the demand available for coupling in each 
market,  and the corresponding pair of net supply curves can 
be calculated on each market .  
With the net export curves associated with of the selected 
block bids, the market’s coordinator can proceed, in the way 
previously described, to determine the exchanges of energy 
and the resulting clearing prices. Then, each market receives 
this information and verifies if this result is consistent with the 
selection of blocks proposed; otherwise both markets redefine 
the selection of blocks; the process is repeated until the block 
selections are prices-compatible.  
In essence, this seems to be the method implemented in the 
existing European coupled markets. Obviously, the lack of 
clear criteria for choosing the subset of blocks makes 
problematic the convergence of this method. Although, at least 
to our knowledge, the concrete rules of these markets are not 
public, it is probably necessary that they use certain rules of 
thumb to ensure the end of the process.  
 
C  A dual formulation of the market coupling problem. 
In the minimization problem under which we have 
formulated the coupling of two markets, it is apparent that 
both the objective function and the restrictions are separable. 
To address the solution of the problem in a decentralized 
manner, it is quite natural then to use the Lagrangian 
relaxation of the restrictions that link variables of the two 
markets, namely those intended to the satisfaction of the 
overall demand and those that impose the equality of clearing 
prices in the two markets.  
This relaxation results in a Lagrangian function which is 
the sum of two functions as  
1 1
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where we have introduced the two multiplier vectors 
 λ λ µ µ1 H 1 Hλ = ( , ..., ),         µ = ( , ..., )  
Since the remaining restrictions only affects the variables 
of each market separately, the dual function can be 
constructed in decoupled way as the sum of the two functions  
,
( , ) min ( , ; , ), 1,2
x u
λ µ x u λ µ     
i i
i i i iL iφ = =  
Notice that in the construction of each of those two functions, 
the only used restrictions are the inequalities in (2), which are 
unique to each market.  
The dual function  
1 2( , ) : ( , ) ( , )λ µ λ µ λ µφ = φ + φ  
is a concave function, typically not differentiable, one of 
whose sub-gradients in each point can be identified 
simultaneously with the determination of function values. Its 
maximization can be addressed iteratively using any of the 
various techniques based on sub-gradient techniques. Once we 
have obtained some optimal (or suboptimal) multipliers 
( , ) arg min ( )* *λ µ  λ,µ∈ φ  
the corresponding value ( , )* *λ µφ of dual function   provides 
us a lower bound of the minimum value of the objective 
function in the primal problem. In general cases, this bound is 
strictly lower, because of the duality gap. Usually, the primal 
variable values  
,
( , ) arg min ( , ; , )
i i
i i iL∈
* * * *
i i
x u
x u   x u λ µ  
do not provide a feasible solution of the primal problem, but 
they can be taken as a basis to obtain feasible solutions 
( , )* *i ix u  , because in most cases they are very close to the 
optimal solution. In this way, it is plausible that good 
candidates to suboptimal solutions can be obtained in a 
decoupled mode. In any case the sum value 
1 2( ) ( )
* * * *
1 1 2 2x ,u x ,uf f+     
gives an upper bound of the minimum value of the primal 
objective function. Its difference with the previously obtained 
lower bound can be used to estimate the quality of this 
suboptimal solution. 
 
III.  NUMERICAL EXPERIENCES 
 
To make an initial assessment of the potentialities of the 
proposed algorithm, it has been applied with simulated data to 
solve the simplified case of the coupling of two markets with 
complex block bids covering two hours. In each market, it is 
assumed that there is a simple offer from variable generation 
whose price is merely proportional to the volume generation, 
i.e. the supply functions of continuous generation are of the 
form 
( )ih ihG q c q=  
Thus the objective function of the auction complex problem is 
a quadratic function, which significantly simplifies the 
computational burden. To model the complex bids, a number 
of indivisible block orders with randomly variable volumes 
are generated for each market. The prices of these blocks have 
been randomly generated around the average value of the 
prices assigned to these volumes by the corresponding supply 
functions in each market. 
The algorithm has been implemented in a MATLAB simple 
program including the macros of the MIQP solver included in 
reference [8] for the solution of the mixed quadratic problems. 
In the numerical tests carried out the number of block orders 
in each market is around 20. This reduced number of blocks is 
used to reduce the time of calculation of the exact solution, but 
the results obtained seem to be independent of the number of 
blocks.  
About in a 30% of the cases the solution obtained in the 
dual approach coincides with the exact solution obtained 
solving the auction problem joining the data from both 
markets. In all other cases, the set of matched block orders 
generated by the dual approach is almost the same as the 
obtained in the exact solution. This suggests the possibility of 
using this algorithm to obtain a good starting point for an 
heuristic search of better solutions, by analyzing the 
possibilities of including in each market some of the blocks 
orders paradoxically rejected. 
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